Robust incentives for risk
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Publication:6146430
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102893OpenAlexW4387233549MaRDI QIDQ6146430
Publication date: 5 February 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102893
Risk models (general) (91B05) Contract theory (moral hazard, adverse selection) (91B41) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Cites Work
- Robustness of simple menus of contracts in cost-based procurement
- Knightian uncertainty and moral hazard
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Screening risk-averse agents under moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case
- Adverse selection under ignorance
- Robust mechanisms: the curvature case
- Randomization is optimal in the robust principal-agent problem
- Calibrated Incentive Contracts
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- Sellers with Misspecified Models
- Robustness and Separation in Multidimensional Screening
- Robust Mechanisms Under Common Valuation
- Robust contracting under common value uncertainty
- Foundations of Dominant-Strategy Mechanisms
- Optimal Auction Design With Common Values: An Informationally Robust Approach
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