Only time will tell: credible dynamic signaling
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Publication:6146432
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102894arXiv2007.09568OpenAlexW3123865591MaRDI QIDQ6146432
Publication date: 5 February 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2007.09568
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Labor markets (91B39)
Cites Work
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