Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102907zbMath1530.91435MaRDI QIDQ6146437

Umut Mert Dur, Yanning Zhang

Publication date: 5 February 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmarket designdiversityaffirmative action

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Responsive affirmative action in school choice
• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
• Stability and strategy-proofness for matching with constraints: A necessary and sufficient condition
• Improving matching under hard distributional constraints
• Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations

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