Lexicographic agreeing to disagree and perfect equilibrium
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Publication:6146438
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102908OpenAlexW4387166501MaRDI QIDQ6146438
Christian W. Bach, Jérémie Cabessa
Publication date: 5 February 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102908
agreeing to disagreeepistemic game theorylexicographic probability systemsperfect equilibriumstatic gamesmutual absolute continuity
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