A dual approach to agency problems
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Publication:6146439
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102909OpenAlexW4387497916MaRDI QIDQ6146439
Chang Koo Chi, Kyoung Jin Choi
Publication date: 5 February 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102909
Cites Work
- Information space conditions for the first-order approach in agency problems
- Moral hazard with bounded payments
- The existence of optimal contracts in the principal-agent model
- Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem
- Comparative Statics, Informativeness, and the Interval Dominance Order
- Two New Conditions Supporting the First-Order Approach to Multisignal Principal-Agent Problems
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
- A general solution method for moral hazard problems
- A Polynomial Optimization Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems
- A unifying approach to incentive compatibility in moral hazard problems
- Efficiency of an Information System in an Agency Model
- An Integral Inequality
- Convex analysis and monotone operator theory in Hilbert spaces
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