Two-stage elimination games
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Publication:6146441
DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102911OpenAlexW4388160574MaRDI QIDQ6146441
Publication date: 5 February 2024
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102911
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)
Cites Work
- Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
- Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
- Sequential two-prize contests
- An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
- The all-pay auction with complete information
- Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
- Effort allocations in elimination tournaments
- The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
- Contest architecture
- Equilibrium existence in contests with bid caps
- What is the Correct Way to Seed a Knockout Tournament?
- TOURNAMENTS AND PAIRED COMPARISONS
- A comparison of the effectiveness of tournaments
- All-Pay Contests
- Comparing Draws for Single Elimination Tournaments
- New Concepts in Seeding Knockout Tournaments
- Large Contests
- On the Probability of Winning with Different Tournament Procedures
- On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
- Optimal seedings in interdependent contests
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