Two-stage elimination games

DOI10.1016/J.JMATECO.2023.102911OpenAlexW4388160574MaRDI QIDQ6146441

Aner Sela

Publication date: 5 February 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102911

zbMATH Keywords

all-pay contestssequential contestssimultaneous contestselimination games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Common-value all-pay auctions with asymmetric information
• Optimal seedings in elimination tournaments
• Sequential two-prize contests
• An analysis of the war of attrition and the all-pay auction
• The all-pay auction with complete information
• Asymmetric all-pay auctions with incomplete information: The two-player case
• Effort allocations in elimination tournaments
• The generalized Stackelberg equilibrium of the all-pay auction with complete information
• Contest architecture
• Equilibrium existence in contests with bid caps
• What is the Correct Way to Seed a Knockout Tournament?
• TOURNAMENTS AND PAIRED COMPARISONS
• A comparison of the effectiveness of tournaments
• All-Pay Contests
• Comparing Draws for Single Elimination Tournaments
• New Concepts in Seeding Knockout Tournaments
• Large Contests
• On the Probability of Winning with Different Tournament Procedures
• On monotone pure-strategy Bayesian-Nash equilibria of a generalized contest
• Optimal seedings in interdependent contests

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