Correlated play in weakest-link and best-shot group contests

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102917OpenAlexW4388336642MaRDI QIDQ6146448

Iryna Topolyan, Stefano Barbieri

Publication date: 5 February 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102917

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumbest shotall-pay auctionpublic randomizationweakest link

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
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• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
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• Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups
• Group Contests with Internal Conflict and Power Asymmetry
• The Existence of Subgame-Perfect Equilibrium in Continuous Games with Almost Perfect Information: A Case for Public Randomization

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