Null players, outside options, and stability: the conditional Shapley value

DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2023.102931zbMath1530.91033MaRDI QIDQ6146454

Pierfrancesco La Mura, André Casajus

Publication date: 5 February 2024

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

stabilityShapley valueTU gameoutside optionsnull playerGamson's law

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
• Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
• Cooperative games with coalition structures
• On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• THE AUMANN-DRÈZE VALUE, THE WIESE VALUE, AND STABILITY: A NOTE
• A TWO-STEP SHAPLEY VALUE FOR COOPERATIVE GAMES WITH COALITION STRUCTURES
• MEASURING THE POWER OF PARTIES WITHIN GOVERNMENT COALITIONS

This page was built for publication: Null players, outside options, and stability: the conditional Shapley value