Core and stability notions in many-to-one matching markets with indifferences

DOI10.1007/s00182-023-00865-0arXiv2203.16293OpenAlexW4383371146MaRDI QIDQ6146789

Agustín G. Bonifacio, Pablo Neme, Noelia Juarez, Jorge A. Oviedo

Publication date: 31 January 2024

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2203.16293

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitycorestrong corestrong stabilitysuper stabilitymatching with indifferencessuper core

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

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• The Pareto-stability concept is a natural solution concept for discrete matching markets with indifferences
• Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
• Stable marriage and indifference
• The structure of stable marriage with indifference
• Two-sided matching with indifferences
• Testing substitutability of weak preferences
• Marriage market with indifferences: a linear programming approach
• Characterisation of Strongly Stable Matchings
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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