Salience reasoning in coordination games

DOI10.1007/s11229-021-03083-xzbMath1529.91015OpenAlexW3135388486MaRDI QIDQ6147148

Julius Schönherr

Publication date: 1 February 2024

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://philpapers.org/rec/SCHSRI-8

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycoordinationcommon knowledgesaliencebelief suspension

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Logics of knowledge and belief (including belief change) (03B42) Decision theory for games (91A35) Other applications of logic (03B80)

Cites Work

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• Being realistic about common knowledge: a lewisian approach
• A logical framework for convention
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Common knowledge revisited
• Knowledge and common knowledge in a distributed environment
• Agnosticism meets Bayesianism
• Two Paradoxes of Common Knowledge: Coordinated Attack and Electronic Mail

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