The in-group egalitarian Owen values

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.013zbMath1530.91031OpenAlexW4385431301MaRDI QIDQ6148356

Satoshi Nakada, Takaaki Abe

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.013

zbMATH Keywords

monotonicityShapley valueOwen valueallocation ruleTU-game with coalition structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

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