Lying for votes
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Publication:6148360
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.015zbMath1530.91159OpenAlexW4385605322MaRDI QIDQ6148360
Subhasish Dugar, Quazi Shahriar
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.015
Voting theory (91B12) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05)
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