Screening for experiments
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Publication:6148361
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2023.07.009zbMath1530.91131OpenAlexW4385237533MaRDI QIDQ6148361
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.009
experimentsBayesian persuasioninformation controlinformation designmechanism design without transfers
Mechanism design theory (91B03) Experimental work for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-05) Principal-agent models (91B43)
Cites Work
- Simple methods for evaluating and comparing binary experiments
- Hidden testing and selective disclosure of evidence
- Mediation, arbitration and negotiation
- Robust incentives for information acquisition
- Partially Verifiable Information and Mechanism Design
- Strategic Information Transmission
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Bayes correlated equilibrium and the comparison of information structures in games
- Persuasion of a Privately Informed Receiver
- Equivalent Comparisons of Experiments
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