Communication with partially verifiable information: an experiment

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.07.011zbMath1530.91117OpenAlexW2916372141MaRDI QIDQ6148364

Martin Sefton, Maria Montero, Valeria Burdea

Publication date: 11 January 2024

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/200426

zbMATH Keywords

experimentcommunicationpartially verifiable messagesverification control

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Cites Work

• Communication with evidence in the lab
• Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
• Disclosure of information under competition: an experimental study
• Strategic reasoning in persuasion games: an experiment
• Can there be a market for cheap-talk information? An experimental investigation
• An experimental analysis of multidimensional cheap talk
• An experimental study of truth-telling in a sender-receiver game
• Overcommunication in strategic information transmission games
• Communication equilibria with partially verifiable types
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Communication with multiple senders: An experiment
• Strategic Communication With Minimal Verification
• Cheap Talk With Transparent Motives
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• On Optimal Rules of Persuasion
• Disclosures and Asset Returns
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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