Incentives in social decision schemes with pairwise comparison preferences
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Publication:6148378
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.08.009arXiv2204.12436OpenAlexW4385989047MaRDI QIDQ6148378
Patrick Lederer, Warut Suksompong, Felix Brandt
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.12436
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