Order independence for rationalizability
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Publication:6148581
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.013zbMath1530.91056OpenAlexW4389117236MaRDI QIDQ6148581
Publication date: 11 January 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2023.11.013
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