Information advantage and payment disadvantage when selling goods through a powerful retailer
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Publication:6148728
DOI10.1007/s10479-020-03889-xOpenAlexW3119087640MaRDI QIDQ6148728
Baozhuang Niu, Qiyang Li, Zifan Shen
Publication date: 8 February 2024
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03889-x
Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Cites Work
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- Outsourcing management under various demand information sharing scenarios
- Interaction between channel strategy and store brand decisions
- Dollar vs. percentage markup pricing schemes under a dominant retailer
- Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand
- Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
- Four payment models for the multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows
- Impact of power structure on supply chain performance and consumer surplus
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