Information advantage and payment disadvantage when selling goods through a powerful retailer

DOI10.1007/s10479-020-03889-xOpenAlexW3119087640MaRDI QIDQ6148728

Baozhuang Niu, Qiyang Li, Zifan Shen

Publication date: 8 February 2024

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-020-03889-x

zbMATH Keywords

information valuechannel competitionaccount periodcash opportunity costretailing strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Trade credit insurance, capital constraint, and the behavior of manufacturers and banks
• Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand
• Pricing policies under direct vs. indirect channel competition and national vs. store brand competition
• When should a manufacturer share truthful manufacturing cost information with a dominant retailer?
• Supply chain interactions due to store-brand introductions: the impact of retail competition
• The impact of manufacturer's encroachment and nonlinear production cost on retailer's information sharing decisions
• Outsourcing management under various demand information sharing scenarios
• Interaction between channel strategy and store brand decisions
• Dollar vs. percentage markup pricing schemes under a dominant retailer
• Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium strategies when the private label competes with the national brand
• Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
• Four payment models for the multi-mode resource constrained project scheduling problem with discounted cash flows
• Impact of power structure on supply chain performance and consumer surplus

This page was built for publication: Information advantage and payment disadvantage when selling goods through a powerful retailer