Licensing pricing discrimination and allocative efficiency about the Chinese dual-use defense technology under a military shareholding contract
DOI10.3934/JIMO.2023115OpenAlexW4386870490MaRDI QIDQ6149304
Abdul Waheed Siyal, Fei Yan, Hongzhuan Chen, Tengjiao Li
Publication date: 5 February 2024
Published in: Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3934/jimo.2023115
allocative efficiencycivilian-military coordinationdiscriminatory licensing pricingdual-use defense technologymilitary shareholding contract
Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Decision theory for games (91A35)
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