Truthful signalling, the heritability paradox, and the Malthusian equi-marginal principle
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Publication:615385
DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2007.09.002zbMath1202.92062OpenAlexW2047640495WikidataQ81572793 ScholiaQ81572793MaRDI QIDQ615385
Kjell Hausken, Jack Hirshleifer
Publication date: 5 January 2011
Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.econ.ucla.edu/workingpapers/wp842.pdf
general equilibriumkin selectionsignallingheredityhandicap principleMalthusian equi-marginal principlemating competition
Related Items (2)
Sexual dimorphism and sexual selection: a unified economic analysis ⋮ A two-sex life history model of handicap signaling
Cites Work
- A long-term genetic model for the evolution of sexual preference: the theories of Fisher and Zahavi re-examined
- Contest success functions
- The truthful signalling hypothesis: an explicit general equilibrium model
- Diffusion models in population genetics
- Game theory and evolution: Finite size and absolute fitness measures
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