A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111548MaRDI QIDQ6154267

Unnamed Author, Sarvesh Bandhu

Publication date: 19 March 2024

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

population monotonicitysocial choice functionstatus quopreference replacementwelfare dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• The replacement principle for the provision of multiple public goods on tree networks
• Problems of fair division and the egalitarian solution
• Tops-only domains
• A characterization of status quo rules in the binary social choice model
• The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
• Random dictatorship domains
• Strategy-proofness of the unanimity with status-quo rule over restricted domains
• Welfare-domination under preference-replacement: a survey and open questions
• Locating libraries on a street
• Public decisions: solidarity and the status quo
• Reaching consensus: solidarity and strategic properties in binary social choice
• The Fair Division of a Fixed Supply Among a Growing Population
• The Pure Compensation Problem: Egalitarianism Versus Laissez-Fairism
• Solidarity in preference aggregation: improving on a status quo

This page was built for publication: A characterization of unanimity with status quo: fixed vs variable population