Unobservable costly effort in security design

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111573OpenAlexW4391365260MaRDI QIDQ6154282

Matthew J. Robertson

Publication date: 19 March 2024

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111573

zbMATH Keywords

adverse selectionsignallingsecurity designsecuritisationcostly effort

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Derivative securities (option pricing, hedging, etc.) (91G20) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Incentive compatibility and differentiability: new results and classic applications
• Securitization and optimal retention under moral hazard
• Strict monotonicity in comparative statics
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
• Strategic Liquidity Supply and Security Design
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept

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