When will evolution lead to deceptive signaling in the Sir Philip Sidney game?

DOI10.1016/J.TPB.2009.02.002zbMath1211.92067OpenAlexW1982968780WikidataQ43465200 ScholiaQ43465200MaRDI QIDQ615596

Peter L. Hurd, Steven Hamblin

Publication date: 5 January 2011

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2009.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

game theorysignalinggenetic algorithmsanimal communication

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Approximation methods and heuristics in mathematical programming (90C59) Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Evolutionary games (91A22) Animal behavior (92D50)

Related Items (1)

Honesty through repeated interactions

Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability in extensive two-person games
• Adaptive dynamics and evolutionary stability
• On evolutionarily stable sets
• Evolutionarily stable sets in symmetric extensive two-person games
• Evolutionarily stable strategies and game dynamics
• Signalling among relatives. II: Beyond the tower of Babel
• The application of genetic algorithms in behavioural ecology, illustrated with a model of anti-predator vigilance
• Oddness of the number of equilibrium points: a new proof
• Non-cooperative games
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• The Logic of Animal Conflict

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