A model of competitive signaling with rich message spaces

DOI10.1007/S10058-021-00279-YzbMath1518.91025OpenAlexW4210401085MaRDI QIDQ6156328

Xu Tan, Tomás Rodríguez Barraquer

Publication date: 13 June 2023

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00279-y

zbMATH Keywords

competitionsignalingasymmetric information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Market signaling with grades
• The optimal choice of pre-launch reviewer
• Job market signaling and employer learning
• Persuasion with costly precision
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• STRING THEORY, THE CRISIS IN PARTICLE PHYSICS AND THE ASCENT OF METAPHORIC ARGUMENTS
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Sequential Equilibria
• MISINFORMATION*

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