Negative voting social welfare functions: a characterization

DOI10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5zbMath1518.91075OpenAlexW3213912628MaRDI QIDQ6156331

Jac C. Heckelman

Publication date: 13 June 2023

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-021-00272-5

zbMATH Keywords

scoring functionsocial welfare functionaxiomatic propertiesmajority loser

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• The informational basis of scoring rules
• A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.
• A simple characterization of the anti-plurality rule
• Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously
• Qualified voting systems
• The inverse plurality rule-an axiomatization
• Une caractérisation du vote à la majorité simple
• A Note on Preference Aggregation
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• The greatest unhappiness of the least number

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