Q-learning in regularized mean-field games
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Publication:6159509
DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00450-2zbMath1519.91032arXiv2003.12151OpenAlexW3013079993MaRDI QIDQ6159509
Berkay Anahtarci, Can Deha Karıksız, Naci Saldi
Publication date: 20 June 2023
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2003.12151
Markov and semi-Markov decision processes (90C40) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Mean field games (aspects of game theory) (91A16)
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