Robust networked multiagent optimization: designing agents to repair their own utility functions

DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00469-5zbMath1519.91044OpenAlexW4294203016WikidataQ113899323 ScholiaQ113899323MaRDI QIDQ6159514

Joshua H. Seaton, Jason R. Marden, Philip N. Brown

Publication date: 20 June 2023

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00469-5

zbMATH Keywords

game theorydistributed optimizationutility designnetworked learning

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Utility theory (91B16) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (1)

Special issue: multi-agent dynamic decision making and learning

Cites Work

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