Designing menus of contracts efficiently: the power of randomization

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2023.103881arXiv2202.10966OpenAlexW4320718729MaRDI QIDQ6161464

Matteo Castiglioni, Alberto Marchesi, Nicola Gatti

Publication date: 27 June 2023

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2202.10966

zbMATH Keywords

contract theoryprincipal-agent problemsBayesian games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Artificial intelligence (68Txx)

Related Items (1)

Learning approximately optimal contracts

Cites Work

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