CHIP and CRISP: protecting all parties against compromise through identity-binding PAKEs

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15979-4_23zbMath1517.94186OpenAlexW3207022174MaRDI QIDQ6162061

Moni Naor, C. J. F. Cremers, Eyal Ronen, Shahar Paz

Publication date: 28 June 2023

Published in: Advances in Cryptology – CRYPTO 2022 (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15979-4_23

zbMATH Keywords

password authenticationkey compromise impersonationPAKEcompromise resiliencesymmetric PAKE

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cryptography (94A60) Data encryption (aspects in computer science) (68P25) Authentication, digital signatures and secret sharing (94A62)

Cites Work

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• Smooth NIZK arguments
• OPAQUE: an asymmetric PAKE protocol secure against pre-computation attacks
• Separating symmetric and asymmetric password-authenticated key exchange
• Strong asymmetric PAKE based on trapdoor CKEM
• Round-Optimal Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
• Fixed Argument Pairings
• Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2004
• Universally Composable Password-Based Key Exchange
• EAGL: An Elliptic Curve Arithmetic GPU-Based Library for Bilinear Pairing
• A Method for Making Password-Based Key Exchange Resilient to Server Compromise
• Security Analysis of CPace

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