Continuous implementation with payoff knowledge

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2023.105624zbMath1518.91040OpenAlexW4323267261MaRDI QIDQ6163291

Yifei Sun, Takashi Kunimoto, Yi-Chun Chen

Publication date: 9 June 2023

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2662

zbMATH Keywords

robustnesstransfersincentive compatibilitycontinuous implementationfull implementation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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