Data curation from privacy-aware agents

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-15714-1_21zbMath1520.91096arXiv2207.06929OpenAlexW4297821719MaRDI QIDQ6164521

Moshe Tennenholtz, Rann Smorodinsky, Roy Shahmoon

Publication date: 28 July 2023

Published in: Algorithmic Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2207.06929

zbMATH Keywords

privacyunique equilibriummechanism design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Information elicitation and sequential mechanisms
• Bayesian persuasion with multiple senders and rich signal spaces
• Selling privacy at auction
• Overcoming free riding in multi-party computations -- the anonymous case
• Non-cooperative computation: Boolean functions with correctness and exclusivity
• Accuracy for Sale
• The Algorithmic Foundations of Differential Privacy
• Rational secret sharing and multiparty computation
• Implementing Mediators with Asynchronous Cheap Talk
• Distributed computing meets game theory
• Theory of Cryptography

This page was built for publication: Data curation from privacy-aware agents