A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems

DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.015OpenAlexW4296640215MaRDI QIDQ6164740

Penélope Hernández, Juan J. Vidal-Puga, Josep E. Peris

Publication date: 4 July 2023

Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.09.015

zbMATH Keywords

game theorycost allocationsubgame perfect equilibriumminimum cost spanning tree

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Cites Work

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• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Minimum cost spanning tree games and population monotonic allocation schemes.
• Subscription mechanisms for network formation.
• Truth-telling and Nash equilibria in minimum cost spanning tree models
• Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value
• The price of imperfect competition for a spanning network
• The optimistic \(TU\) game in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• On the core and nucleolus of minimum cost spanning tree games
• Minimum cost spanning tree games
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
• Submodularity of minimum-cost spanning tree games
• Game Theory
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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