Repeated communication with private lying costs
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Publication:6166489
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2023.105668zbMath1520.91074OpenAlexW4372233680MaRDI QIDQ6166489
Publication date: 6 July 2023
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2023.105668
Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
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Cites Work
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