Implicit incentives for fund managers with partial information
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Publication:6166931
DOI10.1007/s10287-021-00404-warXiv2011.07871OpenAlexW3170533658MaRDI QIDQ6166931
Katia Colaneri, Flavio Angelini, Marco Nicolosi, Stefano Herzel
Publication date: 4 August 2023
Published in: Computational Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2011.07871
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