Optimal tax policy for single homogeneous commodity on \(n\) markets with export costs as a Stackelberg game

DOI10.1007/s10100-022-00822-4OpenAlexW4311361812MaRDI QIDQ6166948

Zrinka Lukač

Publication date: 4 August 2023

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-022-00822-4

zbMATH Keywords

multiple followersStackelberg gameoptimal productionoptimal tax policy\(n\) competing companiesexport costs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

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Cites Work

• Consumption taxes in monopolistic competition: a comment
• Practical bilevel optimization. Algorithms and applications
• Foundations of bilevel programming
• The comparison between ad valorem and unit taxes under monopolistic competition
• Linear bilevel multi-follower programming with independent followers
• Optimal Trade and Industrial Policy under Oligopoly
• On two-level optimization
• Stackelberg Optimization of Two-Level Systems
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