A power side-channel attack on the Reed-Muller Reed-Solomon version of the HQC cryptosystem

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-17234-2_16zbMath1520.94065MaRDI QIDQ6166990

Antonia Wachter-Zeh, Lukas Holzbaur, Georg Sigl, Julian Renner, Thomas Schamberger

Publication date: 7 July 2023

Published in: Post-Quantum Cryptography (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

error correctionside-channel analysispost-quantum cryptographypower analysisHQC

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Linear codes (general theory) (94B05) Cryptography (94A60) Decoding (94B35) Channel models (including quantum) in information and communication theory (94A40) Quantum cryptography (quantum-theoretic aspects) (81P94)

Cites Work

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• A timing attack on the HQC encryption scheme
• A practicable timing attack against HQC and its countermeasure
• Information-set decoding with hints
• Classical misuse attacks on NIST round 2 PQC. The power of rank-based schemes
• Misuse attacks on post-quantum cryptosystems
• Fault-injection attacks against NIST's post-quantum cryptography round 3 KEM candidates

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