Exploiting extensive-form structure in empirical game-theoretic analysis

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_8arXiv2302.01366OpenAlexW4312256357MaRDI QIDQ6167242

Michael P. Wellman, Mithun Chakraborty, Christine Konicki

Publication date: 4 August 2023

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2302.01366

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Games in extensive form (91A18)

Cites Work

• Efficient computation of equilibria for extensive two-person games
• Learning payoff functions in infinite games
• An Exact Double-Oracle Algorithm for Zero-Sum Extensive-Form Games with Imperfect Information
• Probabilistic analysis of simulation-based games
• Unnamed Item

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