Optimal impartial correspondences

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_11arXiv2301.04544OpenAlexW4312862045MaRDI QIDQ6167246

Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Felix Fischer

Publication date: 4 August 2023

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.04544

zbMATH Keywords

votingmechanism designimpartial selection

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Impartial nomination correspondences
• Symmetry and impartial lotteries
• An axiomatic analysis of the papal conclave
• Impartial division of a dollar
• Incentive compatible mechanism for influential agent selection
• Impartial Nominations for a Prize
• A Near-Optimal Mechanism for Impartial Selection
• Optimal Impartial Selection
• Impartial selection with additive approximation guarantees
• Characterizing minimal impartial rules for awarding prizes

This page was built for publication: Optimal impartial correspondences