Better approximation for interdependent SOS valuations

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_13arXiv2210.06507OpenAlexW4312447838MaRDI QIDQ6167251

Chenghan Zhou, Enze Sun, Pinyan Lu

Publication date: 4 August 2023

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2210.06507

zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithmsmechanism designcombinatorial auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Approximation algorithms (68W25) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Efficient assignment with interdependent values
• Auctions with interdependence and SOS: improved approximation
• Prior-free clock auctions for bidders with interdependent values
• A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
• Incentives in Teams
• Efficient Auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Implementation with interdependent valuations

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