Tight bounds on 3-team manipulations in randomized death match
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Publication:6167255
DOI10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_16arXiv2301.07862MaRDI QIDQ6167255
S. Matthew Weinberg, Atanas Dinev
Publication date: 4 August 2023
Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2301.07862
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- Tight bounds on 3-team manipulations in randomized death match
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