Core-stable committees under restricted domains

DOI10.1007/978-3-031-22832-2_18arXiv2108.01987OpenAlexW3189936499MaRDI QIDQ6167258

Piotr Skowron, Grzegorz Pierczyński

Publication date: 4 August 2023

Published in: Web and Internet Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/2108.01987

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Core-stable committees under restricted domains

Cites Work

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• Core-stable committees under restricted domains

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