Economic foundations of generalized games with shared constraint: do binding agreements lead to less Nash equilibria?
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Publication:6167431
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2022.10.036MaRDI QIDQ6167431
Publication date: 10 July 2023
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
game theorygeneralized gamesbinding agreementscollective action problemsindividual and shared constraints
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