Comparing multiagent systems research in combinatorial auctions and voting
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Publication:616771
DOI10.1007/s10472-010-9205-yzbMath1207.68401OpenAlexW2118929269MaRDI QIDQ616771
Publication date: 12 January 2011
Published in: Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10472-010-9205-y
Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Research exposition (monographs, survey articles) pertaining to computer science (68-02) Agent technology and artificial intelligence (68T42)
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