Comparison of the voluntary contribution and Pareto-efficient mechanisms under voluntary participation

DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00828-xzbMath1520.91181MaRDI QIDQ6168259

Takehiko Yamato, Takuma Wakayama

Publication date: 10 July 2023

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

mixed strategiesvoluntary participationvoluntary contribution mechanismnon-excludable public goodsPareto-efficient mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

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