Buyers' welfare maximizing auction design

DOI10.1007/s00182-022-00829-wzbMath1520.91185OpenAlexW4309879530MaRDI QIDQ6168261

Sebastián D. Bauer

Publication date: 10 July 2023

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-022-00829-w

zbMATH Keywords

auction designbuyer participationbuyers' \textit{ex-ante} efficiencybuyers' welfarenon-negative payments

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Incentives in Teams
• Collusion and Price Rigidity
• An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design

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