Marginality and the position value

DOI10.1007/s11750-022-00647-zzbMath1520.91036MaRDI QIDQ6168658

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Publication date: 11 July 2023

Published in: Top (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

game theoryTU-gameposition valuecommunication situationsmarginalityPL-marginality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Cites Work

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