Top trading cycles with reordering: improving match priority in school choice

DOI10.1007/S00355-022-01422-6zbMath1520.91262OpenAlexW4288052322MaRDI QIDQ6168800

Aram Arutyanovich Grigoryan

Publication date: 11 July 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01422-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• Improving schools through school choice: a market design approach
• Two simple variations of top trading cycles
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• On cores and indivisibility
• THE EQUITABLE TOP TRADING CYCLES MECHANISM FOR SCHOOL CHOICE
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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