Core stability of the Shapley value for cooperative games

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01432-4zbMath1520.91028OpenAlexW3189425366MaRDI QIDQ6168807

Publication date: 11 July 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01432-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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