Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences

DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01427-1zbMath1520.91207OpenAlexW3176485737MaRDI QIDQ6168816

Publication date: 11 July 2023

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01427-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Stable and efficient reallocations when preferences are single-dipped ⋮ Uniform rules for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences when free-disposal is possible

Cites Work

Coalitional stability in the location problem with single-dipped preferences: an application of the minimax theorem
Efficient and strategy-proof social choice when preferences are single-dipped
Non-bossiness
Pigouvian pricing and stochastic evolutionary implementation
Characterizing natural implementability: The fair and Walrasian correspondences
The replacement principle in public good economies with single-peaked preferences
Consistent solutions to the problem of fair division when preferences are single-peaked
Strategy-proof division of a private good when preferences are single-dipped
On Nash implementability in allotment economies under domain restrictions with indifference
Potential games
Best-response potential games
Nash implementation in an allocation problem with single-dipped preferences
Domains, ranges and strategy-proofness: the case of single-dipped preferences
Generalized average rules as stable Nash mechanisms to implement generalized median rules
Learning dynamics for mechanism design: an experimental comparison of public goods mechanisms
Probabilistic allocation rules and single-dipped preferences
On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information
Implementation in Undominated Strategies: A Look at Bounded Mechanisms
Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
Toward Natural Implementation
Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing
Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
Negative Externalities and Evolutionary Implementation
Coalitional strategy-proofness in economies with single-dipped preferences and the assignment of an indivisible object

This page was built for publication: Binary mechanism for the allocation problem with single-dipped preferences