Balanced VCG mechanisms for sequencing problems
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Publication:6168820
DOI10.1007/s00355-020-01306-7zbMath1520.91092OpenAlexW3119385738MaRDI QIDQ6168820
Manipushpak Mitra, Youngsub Chun, Suresh Mutuswami
Publication date: 11 July 2023
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-020-01306-7
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