A modification aimed at reducing the manipulability and inefficiency of the Boston school choice mechanism
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Publication:6168823
DOI10.1007/S00355-021-01331-0OpenAlexW3153927448MaRDI QIDQ6168823
Publication date: 11 July 2023
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01331-0
Cites Work
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Constrained school choice
- Cognitive ability and games of school choice
- School Choice with Consent*
- Axioms for Deferred Acceptance
- Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
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